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Abstract
This paper provides a method to prove existence of solutions to some moral hazard
problems with inﬁnite set of outcomes. The argument is based on the concept of
nondecreasing rearrangement and on a supermodular version of Hardy-Littlewood’s
inequality. The method also provides qualitative properties of solutions. Both the
cases of wage contracts and of insurance contracts are studied.
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1 Introduction
Since Mirrlees’ early work [Mirrlees (1975)], the principal-agent problem when
there is moral hazard has received a lot of attention. Under the assump-
tion that the agent chooses an action from a real interval, a ﬁrst line of re-
search on the subject has focused on the so-called ”ﬁrst-order approach” (see
[Holmstrom (1975)], [Jewitt (1988)], [Rogerson (1985)]) which involves relax-
ing the constraint that the agent chooses an action which is utility maximiz-
ing to require only that the agent chooses an action at which his utility is a
stationary point. Rogerson [Rogerson (1985)] and Jewitt [Jewitt (1988)] have
given suﬃcient conditions for the ﬁrst-order approach to be valid. By this,
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second-best problem) and the relaxed problem have the same solutions (with-
out taking into account extreme eﬀorts). Rogerson [Rogerson (1985)] and Je-
witt [Jewitt (1988)] prove the monotonicity of the optimal solutions of the
relaxed problem, a fundamental result for the validity of the ﬁrst-order ap-
proach and deduce the monotonicity of second-best solutions (modulo extreme
eﬀorts). However, their results depend heavily on whether there exist solutions
to the second-best problem and to the relaxed problem. This is by no mean a
restriction if the set of outcomes is ﬁnite since under mild continuity assump-
tions on the datas of the model, there exist solutions to these problems. This
fact has been noticed by Grossman and Hart [Grossman and Hart (1983)] who
under the assumption that there were a ﬁnite number of outcomes, proved di-
rectly the existence of solutions to the second-best problem and gave suﬃcient
conditions for their monotonicity using ﬁrst-order arguments.
When the set of outcomes is inﬁnite, a standard weak-compactness argument
may not be applied to prove existence of solutions because of the lack of con-
vexity (hence of weak upper semicontinuity) of the problem studied. A second
line of research, starting with Page [Page (1987)] has developed an existence
theory to principal-agents problems, in a general abstract framework. Exis-
tence is proven under mild topological assumptions provided that the set of
admissible contracts fulﬁlls, ex ante, some compactness property. In partic-
ular, Page ([Page (1987)], [Page (1991)]) gives several examples of contract
sets containing optimal contracts, including the case of bounded monotone
contrats.
Our paper lies in between these two streams of reseach. As in [Balder (1996)],
[Page (1987)], and [Page (1991)], we deal with the issue of existence of second-
best solutions. Our framework is that of [Jewitt (1988)] and [Rogerson (1985)]
with a continuum of monetary outcomes and we also use the ﬁrst-order ap-
proach. It is well-known that, under the monotone likelihood ratio hypothe-
sis (MLRC), the optimal solutions to the relaxed problem, if they exist, are
monotone. This fact in itself, however, does not allow to restrict the study
of the relaxed problem to nondecreasing admissible contracts. Our speciﬁc
contribution is to show that under (MLRC), any admissible contract for the
relaxed problem is dominated by a nondecreasing admissible contract. This
is obtained by using the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a
supermodular version of Hardy-Littlewood’s inequality. This property allows
us to assume without loss of generality, that admissible contracts are non-
decreasing and to obtain existence of solutions to the relaxed problem by a
standard compactness argument (Helly’s theorem). We then use the convexity
of the distribution function hypothesis (CDFC) to prove existence and mono-
tonicity (modulo boundary cases) of second-best contracts. While the MLRC
hypothesis is essential to our rearrangement argument, the CDFC hypothesis
2is only used for sake of simplicity.
We study two cases:
• wage contracts which are assumed to be unconstrained and such that the
observation of a higher level of output allows the inference that the agent
worked harder in the sense of stochastic dominance,
• insurance contracts that are assumed to be constrained by liabilities and
such that the observation of a higher loss allows the inference that the
agent did less eﬀort in the sense of stochastic dominance.
In section 2, we recall a standard model of wage contracts with moral hazard
with a real interval of actions and an inﬁnite number of outcomes. The second-
best problem is introduced as well as some assumptions. Section 3 is devoted
to the study of a relaxation of the second-best problem. Using rearrangement
techniques, we ﬁrst prove that any contract admissible for the relaxed problem
is dominated by a nondecreasing admissible contract and that without loss of
generality, admissible contracts for the relaxed problem may be assumed to be
nondecreasing. We then deduce existence of optimal solutions to the doubly-
relaxed problem. In section 4, combining those results with standard results in
the ﬁrst-order approach literature, we prove existence of second-best contracts
and fully characterize them. Section 5 is devoted to the special case of a risk-
neutral principal and section 6 to that of insurance contracts.
2 The model
We consider a standard principal-agent model with moral hazard with a con-
tinuum of actions and a continuum of outcomes. Agents choose an eﬀort e
from R+ that is unobservable to the principal. The outcome x belongs to the
given segment [0,x]. The probability law of outcome when the agent’s eﬀort
is e is given by a density f(x,e). Let w(x) be the wage paid to the agent if
outcome x occurs.





u(w(x))f(x,e)dx − e. (1)




v(x − w(x))f(x,e)dx. (2)





and individually rational if:
U(w,e) ≥ u (4)
where u is a minimum expected utility level the agents must be guaranteed.
The principal’s second-best problem then reads as:
sup{V (w,e) : e ≥ 0, (w,e) satisﬁes (3) and (4)}.
We introduce the following assumptions on the data.
(H1): The utility functions u and v : R → R are strictly concave, increasing,








(H2): (i) The density function f(.,.) is continuous on [0,x] × R+,
(ii) there exist constants b > a > 0 such that f(x,e) ∈ [a,b] for all (x,e),
(iii) for all x, f(x,.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the ﬁrst and sec-
ond partial derivatives of f with respect to e, fe and fee are jointly continuous
and bounded on [0,x] × R+.




u(w(x))fe(x,e)dx − 1 ≥ 0. (5)
Let A be the set of pairs (w,e) that fulﬁll (4) and (5):
A := {(w,e) : e ≥ 0, (w,e) satisﬁes (4) and (5)}.
(H3): The set A is nonempty and there exists (w,e) ∈ A such that V (w,e) >
−∞.
(MLRC): For all e ≥ 0, the function LR(.,.) : x 7→ LR(x,e) := fe(x,e)/f(x,e)
is nondecreasing on [0,x].
We shall sometimes use the stronger assumption:
(MLRCstrong): For all e ≥ 0, the function LR(.,.) : x 7→ LR(x,e) :=
fe(x,e)/f(x,e) is increasing on [0,x].
43 The doubly-relaxed problem
Following [Rogerson (1985)], we deﬁne the principal’s doubly-relaxed problem
as:
sup{V (w,e), (w,e) ∈ A}.
This section is devoted to the study of this program. We shall prove existence
and monotonicity of solutions. This will follow from rearrangement inequalities
that we recall in the next paragraph.
3.1 Rearrangements and supermodularity
For the proofs of the results given in this paragraph and some applications, we
refer the interested reader to [Lorentz (1953)], see also [Carlier and Dana (2002)]
and the references listed therein.
Let µ be a probability measure on [0,x]. Assume that µ is absolutely contin-
uous with respect to Lebesgue’s measure and that it admits a continuous and
positive density f on [0,x].
Deﬁnition-Property 1 Two Borel functions on [0,x], v and w are equimea-
surable with respect to µ if and only if they fulﬁll one of the following equivalent
conditions:
(1) µ(v−1(B)) = µ(w−1(B)) for every Borel subset B of R,







Proposition 1 Let w be any real-valued Borel function on [0,x]. Then there
exists a unique right-continuous nondecreasing function, e w, which is equimea-
surable to w.
In the previous statement e w is called the nondecreasing rearrangement of w
(with respect to the probability µ). One may similarly deﬁne the nonincreasing
rearrangement of w with respect to µ as the unique right-continuous nonin-
creasing function which is equimeasurable to w.
A crucial feature of rearrangements lies in rearrangement inequalities, essen-
tially discovered by Hardy and Littlewood and extended since. Such inequal-




5increase when one replaces the arbitrary functions v(.) and w(.) by their
nondecreasing rearrangements e v(.) and e w(.) when the integrand L satisﬁes
a Spence-Mirrlees type or supermodularity condition (see [Lorentz (1953)]).
Deﬁnition 1 Let L be a function : R × R → R. L is called supermodular
(respectively strictly supermodular) if, for all (v,h) ∈ R × R∗
+:
w 7→ [L(v + h,w) − L(v,w)] is nondecreasing (respectively increasing) on R.
If L is of class C2 a necessary and suﬃcient condition for L to be supermodular
is that the cross-derivative ∂2
vwL remains nonnegative. Classical examples of
supermodular functions are L(v,w) = vw, L(v,w) = U(v−w) with U concave
or L(v,w) = g(v + w) with g convex.
Proposition 2 Let L be a continuous and supermodular function. Let v and
w be two real-valued Borel functions deﬁned on [0,x] and e v and e w be their
nondecreasing rearrangements with respect to µ. We then have:
Z x
0




provided that the rightmost member of this inequality is well-deﬁned.
If L is strictly supermodular, we further have:
Proposition 3 Let L be a continuous and strictly supermodular function. Let
w be a real-valued Borel function deﬁned on [0,x] and e w be its nondecreasing
rearrangement with respect to µ. If one has:
Z x
0




then w = e w µ-a.e..
In insurance models, we shall deal with limited liability constraints. The fol-
lowing result gives conditions under which those constraints are closed under
rearrangements.
Lemma 4 Let w be any real-valued Borel function deﬁned on [0,x] and let
e w be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to µ. Let f and g be two
nondecreasing functions: [0,x] → R. If f ≤ w ≤ g µ-a.e, then f ≤ e w ≤ g
µ-a.e.
3.2 Existence of a solution
Using rearrangement techniques recalled above, we ﬁrst obtain:
6Lemma 5 Assume (H1), (H2), (H3) and (MLRC). Let (w,e) ∈ A and
let e w be the nondecreasing rearrangement of w with respect to the probability
measure f(x,e)dx. Then, ( e w,e) ∈ A and V ( e w,e) ≥ V (w,e). Moreover the
previous inequality is strict unless w is nondecreasing.
Proof: Let (w,e) ∈ A and let e w be the nondecreasing rearrangement of
w with respect to the probability measure f(x,e)dx. By equimeasurability,









u( e w(x))LR(x,e)f(x,e)dx = Ue( e w,e).
This proves that ( e w,e) ∈ A.





v(x − w(x))f(x,e)dx ≤
Z x
0
v(x − e w(x))f(x,e)dx = V ( e w,e)
and by Proposition 3, the inequality is strict unless w = e w a.e..
From Lemma 5, monotonicity is a necessary optimality condition for the
doubly-relaxed problem. We may thus assume, without loss of generality, in
the doubly-relaxed problem that w is nondecreasing. It should be noted that
this monotonicity result is not based on a ﬁrst-order argument.
Theorem 1 Under assumptions (H1), (H2), (H3) and (MLRC) the
doubly-relaxed problem has a solution, (w,e) with w nondecreasing on [0,x].
Moreover, any solution to the doubly-relaxed problem is nondecreasing.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
4 The second-best problem
Let us now introduce the condition:
7(CDFC): For all x ∈ [0,x], the function e 7→ F(x,e) :=
R x
0 f(s,e)ds is convex
on R+.
The following concavity result is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 6 Assume (CDFC). If w is nondecreasing and such that u ◦ w is
integrable on [0,x], then the function e 7→ U(w,e) is concave on R+.
The next result is classical, a proof is given in the appendix for the sake of
completeness.
Proposition 7 Assume (H1), (H2), (H3), and (MLRC). Let (w,e) be a
solution to the doubly-relaxed problem, then:
Ue(w,e) = 0.
To be able to solve the second-best problem, we need an additional assumption:
(H4): The problem:
sup{V (w,0) : (w,0) satisﬁes (3) and (4) } (7)
has a solution w∗ provided its admissible set is nonempty.
Suﬃcient conditions for assumption (H4) to be satisﬁed will be given in Lem-
mas 8 and 9. Furthermore, we shall see in the next section that, if the principal
is risk-neutral, then (H4) is satisﬁed.
We may now state an existence result for the second-best problem:
Theorem 2 Assume (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4), (MLRC) and (CDFC).
Then the second-best problem has a solution. Furthermore, we have the fol-
lowing alternative:
• either there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(w∗,0) and w∗ solves (7),
• or the doubly-relaxed problem and the second-best problem have the same
solutions.
Proof:
If there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(w∗,0) (so that w∗ solves the program (7)) there is nothing to prove. Let us
assume then that there exists no second-best solution with e = 0 and let us
prove in this case that the second-best and the doubly-relaxed problems have
the same solutions.
8Let (w,e) be a solution to the doubly-relaxed problem (Theorem 1 ensures
the existence of such a solution and that w is nondecreasing). Lemma 6 and
Proposition 7 imply that (w,e) is incentive-compatible. Let us prove that:
if (w,e) satisﬁes (3) and (4), then V (w,e) ≥ V (w,e).
Let (w,e) satisfy (3) and (4). If e > 0, then (w,e) ∈ A, hence V (w,e) ≥
V (w,e). If e = 0, by (H4), there exists a solution w∗ to (7) and V (w∗,0) ≥
V (w,0). Since by assumption (w∗,0) is not a second-best solution, there exists
(w0,e0) satisfying (3) and (4) with e0 > 0 and V (w0,e0) > V (w∗,0). Since
(w0,e0) ∈ A, V (w,e) ≥ V (w0,e0) > V (w,0). This proves that (w,e) is a
solution to the second-best problem.
Conversely, let (w∗,e∗) solve the second-best problem. Since e∗ > 0, (w∗,e∗) ∈
A, hence V (w∗,e∗) = V (w,e). This establishes that (w∗,e∗) solves the doubly-
relaxed problem.
Let us now give conditions that ensure that (H4) is satisﬁed. Proofs are given
in the appendix.
Lemma 8 Assume (H1), (H2), (MLRC), (CDFC). If, in addition:
fe(x,0) = 0 for all x ∈ [0,x], (8)
then (H4) is satisﬁed.
Remark. An example of parametrized cumulative distribution functions sat-





, for all e ≥ 0 (9)
where α(.) is any positive convex, diﬀerentiable, increasing function such that
α0(0) = 0
Lemma 9 Assume (H1), (H2), (MLRC). If, in addition, for all e ≥ 0,
the function:






is supermodular on [0,x] × R, (10)
then (H4) is satisﬁed.
9Remark. Contrary to condition (8), condition (10) depends on u. It is tightly


















By (MLRC), the second term is nonnegative (see [Milgrom (1981)] for de-
tails) whereas the ﬁrst changes sign and is weighted by risk aversion index.








≥ δ > 0
then (10) is satisﬁed if ρ is small enough (or more generally when the risk
aversion index is bounded by a small enough constant).
5 Risk-neutral principal
In this section we study the case of a risk-neutral principal and of risk-averse
agents. More precisely, we assume:
(H1’): The principal is risk neutral i.e. v(x) = x for all x ∈ R. The agents’
utility function u : R → R is strictly concave, increasing, twice continuously





We shall see that the linearity of v simpliﬁes the problem since assumption
(H4) is always satisﬁed in this case. As previously, we deﬁne the principal’s
second-best and doubly-relaxed problems. In the risk-neutral case the princi-






Proposition 10 Under assumptions (H1’), (H2), (H3) and (MLRC)
the doubly-relaxed problem has a solution), (w,e) with w nondecreasing on
[0,x]. If furthermore (MLRCstrong) is fulﬁlled, then any solution to the
doubly-relaxed problem is nondecreasing.
10The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 1. Monotonicity of solu-
tions is no more a necessary optimality condition but, due to linearity, some
limiting arguments are simpler. It may be found in the appendix.
The next result is proved in the appendix. It states that (H4) is always sat-
isﬁed in the risk-neutral case.
Lemma 11 Assume (H1’), (H2), (H3) and (MLRC), then:
sup{V (w,0) : (w,0) satisﬁes (3) and (4) } (11)
has a nonincreasing solution w∗ provided its admissible set is nonempty.
Theorem 3 Assume (H’1), (H2), (H3), (MLRC) and (CDFC). Then
the second-best problem has a solution. More precisely, the following holds:
• either there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(w∗,0) and w∗ solves (11),
• or the doubly-relaxed problem and the second-best problem have the same
nondecreasing solutions and any solution (w∗,e∗) to the second-best problem
is such that (˜ w∗,e∗) with ˜ w∗ the nondecreasing rearrangement of w∗ with
respect to f(x,e)dx is a solution to the second-best problem.
Assume furthermore (MLRCstrong), then we have the following alternative:
• either there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(w∗,0) and w∗ solves (11),
• or the doubly-relaxed problem and the second-best problem have the same
solutions.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and therefore left to the reader.
It is well-known that the drawback of the previous approach is that the CDFC
assumption has no obvious economic interpretation. [Jewitt (1988)] proposed
alternative conditions under which, in the risk-neutral case, the ﬁrst-order
approach is valid. We mention without proof that our results remain true if
one replaces the CDFC assumption by those introduced by Jewitt.
116 The case of Insurance
We end the paper by an application of our method to an insurance frame-
work. Since the main arguments are similar to those given above 1 , proofs are
omitted.
6.1 The model
An agent with initial wealth w0 may incur a random loss X whose density func-
tion f(x,e) over the interval [0,x] depends on the agent’s eﬀort e in avoiding
the loss. It is assumed that the agent’s utility (which depends on wealth and





where W(x) is the agent’s wealth if a loss x occurs. The insurer oﬀers a contract
(Π,I) consisting of an indemnity scheme I : R+ → R+ such that 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x
and of a premium Π ≥ 0. Whenever he buys a contract, the agent’s random
wealth is
W(X) = w0 − Π + I(X) − X.
The agent chooses his eﬀort before uncertainty is revealed subject to achiev-
ing a reservation level and an incentive compatibility constraint. The insurer
assumed here to be either risk neutral or risk-averse, then chooses the opti-












U(W,e) ≥ u, (13)
e ≥ 0, Π ≥ 0, (14)
w0 − Π − X ≤ W(X) ≤ w0 − Π. (15)
6.2 Assumptions
(H1b): The agent’s utility function u: R → R is strictly concave, increasing
and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The insurer’s utility function v: R → R
1 A previous version of the present paper with detailed proofs for the insurance case
can be downloaded at: http://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/Publications.php.
12is concave, increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
(H2b): The density function f(.,.) is continuous on [0,x] × R+. For all x,
f(x,.) is continuously diﬀerentiable and the ﬁrst partial derivatives of f with
respect to e, fe is jointly continuous on [0,x] × R+.
Let us introduce the relaxed condition:
Ue(W,e) ≥ 0. (16)
(H3b): Let A := {(Π,W,e) that satisﬁes (13),(14),(15),(16)}. Then A 6= ∅.
(MLRCb): For all e ≥ 0, the function LR(.,.) : x 7→ LR(x,e) := fe(x,e)/f(x,e)
is nonincreasing on [0,x].
(MLRCbstrong): For all e ≥ 0, the function LR(.,.) : x 7→ LR(x,e) :=
fe(x,e)/f(x,e) is decreasing on [0,x].




As in the previous model, the doubly-relaxed problem is deﬁned by:
sup{V (W,e), (Π,W,e) ∈ A}.
To be able to solve the second-best problem, we need the additional assump-
tion:
(H4b): The problem:
sup{V (W,0),(Π,W,0) satisﬁes (12),(13),(14),(15)} (17)
has a solution provided its admissible set is nonempty.
6.3 Existence of second-best solutions
We may now state an existence result for the second-best problem:
Theorem 4 Assume (H1b), (H2b), (H3b), (H4b), (MLRCb) and (CD-
FCb). Then the second-best problem has a solution. More precisely, the fol-
lowing holds:
13• either there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(Π∗,W ∗,0) and (Π∗,W ∗) solves (17),
• or the doubly-relaxed problem and the second-best problem have the same
nonincreasing solutions and any solution (Π,W,e) to the second-best prob-
lem is such that (Π, ˜ W,e) with ˜ W the nonincreasing rearrangement of W
with respect to the measure f(x,e)dx is a solution to the second-best prob-
lem.
Assume furthermore either (MLRCbstrong) or v strictly concave, then we
have the following alternative:
• either there exists an optimal solution to the second-best problem of the form
(Π∗,W ∗,0) and (Π∗,W ∗) solves (17)
• or the doubly-relaxed problem and the second-best problem have the same
solutions.
Let us ﬁnally give suﬃcient conditions for (H4b) to hold.
Lemma 12 Assume either,
• (H1b), (H2b), (MLRCb), (CDFCb) and fe(x,0) = 0 for all x ≥ 0, or







is supermodular on [0,x] × R
then (H4b) is satisﬁed.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1






Let us ﬁrst check that the value of the doubly-relaxed is ﬁnite. By (H3), A 6= ∅.
Let (w,e) ∈ A. By assumptions (H1) and (H2), there exists constants C > 0
























14Hence, by (18), (19) and (H3), the value of the doubly-relaxed problem is
ﬁnite.
Let us now consider a sequence (wn,en) ∈ AN such that V (wn,en) converges
to this ﬁnite value. By the estimates (18), (19), and the fact that en ≥ 0 we









v(x − wn(x))f(x,en)dx, and en. (20)
By Lemma 5, we may assume that each wn is nondecreasing.
Let us now prove that wn is bounded in L1. By assumption (H1), there exists
constants b > c > 0 and b0 > c0 > 0 and (a,a0) ∈ R2 such that for for all
x ∈ [0,x] and all w ∈ R, one has:


















Hence the sequence wn is bounded in L1. Since each wn is nondecreasing,
it follows from Helly’s Theorem (see for instance [Natanson (1967)]) that a
subsequence of wn (again denoted wn) converges pointwise to a nondecreasing
function w. Similarly, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may also assume
that en converges to some e ≥ 0.
Let us now prove that (w,e) is a solution to the doubly-relaxed problem. From
assumption (H1), there exists a constant A > 0 such that for all (x,w) ∈
[0,x] × R:
u(w) ≤ A(1 + |w|
α), v(x − w) ≤ A(1 + |x − w|
α). (21)
Since |wn|α is bounded in L1/α which is reﬂexive, we may assume that |wn|α











By Fatou’s Lemma, (21) and (22), we obtain
U(w,e) ≥ limnU(wn,en) ≥ u.
15A similar argument yields
V (w,e) ≥ limnV (wn,en). (23)
Finally, applying Fatou’s Lemma and (21) to the sequence (A(1+|wn|α)|fe(x,en)|−
u(wn(x))fe(x,en)), we obtain:
Ue(w,e) ≥ 0.
Hence (w,e) ∈ A and from (23), (w,e) is a solution to the doubly-relaxed
problem.
The fact that any solution to the doubly-relaxed problem is nondecreasing
follows from Lemma 5.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof:
Let us ﬁrst assume that w is bounded. Since u ◦ w is nondecreasing and of









F(x,e)dµ(x) + u(w(x)) − e
where µ is a nonnegative measure (the derivative of u◦w). From the (CDFC)
assumption, F is convex with respect to e. Hence e 7→ U(w,e) is concave. This
proves that, if w is bounded, then e 7→ U(w,e) is concave.
If w is not assumed to be bounded, let us consider the sequence wn deﬁned
for n large enough, by:
wn(x) =

     
     
w(1/n) if x ∈ [0,1/n)
w(x) if x ∈ [1/n,x − 1/n]
w(x − 1/n) if x ∈ [x − 1/n,x].
16By the preceding, argument, for all n, the function e 7→ U(wn,e) is concave.
By Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem and the fact that u(w) is in
L1, for every e ≥ 0:
lim
n U(wn,e) = U(w,e)
which proves the desired concavity result.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: Let us ﬁrst prove that Ue(w,e) = 0. We already know that Ue(w,e) ≥
0. The Lagrangian of the doubly-relaxed problem is:
L(w,e,λ,µ,ν) := V (w,e) + λe + µU(w,e) + νUe(w,e)
Kuhn and Tucker necessary conditions (it is easy to check that the constraints
of the doubly-relaxed problem are qualiﬁed at (w,e)) yield that for nonnega-
tive multipliers (λ,µ,ν):
Ve(w,e) + λ + µUe(w,e) + νUee(w,e) = 0 (24)
v
0(x − w(x)) = µu
0(w(x)) + νu
0(w(x))LR(x,e) (25)
Assume now by contradiction that Ue(w,e) > 0. Then the complementary
slackness condition in Kuhn and Tucker Theorem implies that ν = 0 and (25)
yields
v
0(x − w(x)) = µu
0(w(x))
so that µ > 0 and x 7→ x − w(x) is nondecreasing. Now (24) implies:






and as the correlation with respect to the probability measure f(x,e)dx of the








As the second factor in the rightmost member of this inequality is zero, we
get a contradiction with (26). Hence Ue(w,e) = 0.
177.4 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof: If the admissible set of (7) is empty, there is nothing to prove. Let
w be admissible for (7) and e w be the nondecreasing rearrangement of w with
respect to f(x,0)dx. As in the proof of Theorem 1, one has, V ( e w,0) > V (w,0)
and U( e w,0) = U(w,0) ≥ u. Let us check that ( e w,0) is incentive-compatible.
By Lemma 6,
e 7→ U( e w,e) is concave on R+
and from (8), Ue( e w,0) = −1. Thus ( e w,0) is incentive-compatible. hence mono-
tonicity is a necessary optimality condition for (7). The existence proof may
then be done exactly as in the proof of theorem 1.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof: If the admissible set of (7) is empty there is nothing to prove. Let w
be such that (w,0) satisﬁes (3) and (4) and let
ˆ w(x) := x − e y(x)
where y(x) := x − w(x) and e y denotes the nondecreasing rearrangement of y
with respect to f(x,0)dx. By equimeasurability of x − ˆ w and x − w, we ﬁrst
have V (ˆ w,0) = V (w,0). From (6), on the one hand, we obtain:
U(ˆ w,0) ≥ U(w,0) ≥ u.
On the other hand, from (3) and (10), we have that, for all e ≥ 0:
Z x
0
u(ˆ w(x))(f(x,0) − f(x,e))dx =
Z x
0







u(w(x))(f(x,0) − f(x,e))dx ≥ −e.
Hence (ˆ w,0) is incentive-compatible.
The previous argument shows that there exists a a maximizing sequence (wn)
of (7) such that, for every n, x 7→ x − wn(x) is nondecreasing and we end
the proof, by the same estimates and convergence arguments as in Theorem
1 (applying Helly’s theorem to x − wn which does not change the arguments
of the proof).
187.6 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof: We still denote by A the admissible set of the doubly-relaxed prob-
lem. By (H3), A 6= ∅. Let (w,e) ∈ A. By assumptions (H1’) and (H2) there












By linearity of V , there exists a constant C0 such that
V (w,e) ≤ C
0 for all (w,e) ∈ A. (28)
Hence, by (28) and (H3), the value of the doubly-relaxed problem is ﬁnite.
Let us now consider a sequence (wn,en) ∈ AN such that V (wn,en) converges
to this ﬁnite value. By the estimates (27), (28), and the fact that en ≥ 0, we






u(wn(x))f(x,en)dx, V (wn,en), and en. (29)
By Lemma 5, we may also assume that each wn is nondecreasing.
Let us now prove that wn is bounded in L1. By assumption (H1’), there exists
constants a ∈ R and b > c > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0,x] and all w ∈ R, one
has:
u(w) ≤ a − bw− + cw+.
Hence, it follows from (29) that there exists γ ∈ R and ε ∈ (0,1) such that:
Z x
0






















0 wn+. This shows that wn is
bounded in L1. Since each wn is nondecreasing, some subsequence of wn (again
denoted wn) converges pointwise to a nondecreasing function w. Similarly,
taking a subsequence if necessary, we may also assume that en converges to
e ≥ 0.
19Since wn is bounded in L1 (again up to a subsequence) we may assume that the
sequence of Radon measures µn deﬁned by dµn := wndx converges weakly ∗ (in
the sense of the duality between continuous functions and Radon measures)
to some measure µ. Since wn converges pointwise to w, one obviously has













n V (wn,en) = V (w,e). (30)
Finally we prove exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 that
U(w,e) ≥ limnU(wn,en) ≥ u and Ue(w,e) ≥ 0.
Hence (w,e) ∈ A and from (30) we deduce that (w,e) is a solution to the
doubly-relaxed problem.
It remains to prove the second assertion under (MLRCstrong). Assume that
(w,e) is a solution to the doubly-relaxed problem, then so is ( e w,e) (where e w is
the nondecreasing rearrangement of w with respect to the probability measure
f(x,e)dx). By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 7, one has
Ue( e w,e) = 0. On the other hand, by Proposition 3, (MLRCstrong) implies
Ue( e w,e) ≥ Ue(w,e) ≥ 0 and the inequality is strict unless w = e w a.e., so that
w is nondecreasing.
7.7 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof: If the admissible set of (11) is empty, there is nothing to prove. Let
us therefore assume that it is nonempty. Let w be such that (w,0) satisﬁes
(3) and (4), and let ˆ w be the nonincreasing rearrangement of w with respect
to f(x,0)dx. By equimeasurability, one ﬁrst gets:
U(ˆ w,0) = U(w,0) ≥ u and V (ˆ w,0) = V (w,0)
Let us prove that (ˆ w,0) is incentive-compatible. For all e > 0, from (MLRC)
one has x 7→
f(x,e)





















which proves that (ˆ w,0) is incentive-compatible. The existence proof may then
be done exactly as in the proof of theorem 1.
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